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ABSTRACT: This report analyzes the health reform bill passed by the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the reform provisions under consideration in the Senate that would affect 
providers’ financial incentives, the organization and delivery of health care services, investment 
in prevention and population health, and the capacity to achieve the best health care and health 
outcomes for all. The bills represent a pragmatic approach to closing the gaps in insurance 
coverage by: building on a mix of employer coverage, other private plans, and a public plan in a 
health insurance exchange, or exchanges; strengthening Medicare; and expanding Medicaid. Even 
under current estimates, 18 million to 24 million people will remain uninsured, however, and 
many others will still face financial barriers to obtaining needed care or hardship in paying 
premiums or medical bills. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
To achieve a high performance health system, health reform must go beyond 
ensuring affordable coverage to addressing health system changes that will improve 
Americans’ health outcomes and the quality of health care, increase efficiency, and slow 
the growth in total health system costs. This report analyzes the health reform bill passed 
by the U.S. House of Representatives and the reform provisions under consideration in 
the Senate that would affect providers’ financial incentives, the organization and delivery 
of health care services, investment in prevention and population health, and the capacity 
to achieve the best health care and health outcomes for all. 
 
Congress has fashioned health reform plans that will fundamentally change our 
present course of rising costs and increasing numbers of uninsured and underinsured 
people. The bills represent a pragmatic approach to closing the gaps in insurance coverage 
by: building on a mix of employer coverage, other private plans, and a public plan in a 
health insurance exchange, or exchanges; strengthening Medicare; and expanding 
Medicaid. Most of the ideas that have been advanced by policymakers and health care 
opinion leaders to deal with rising costs are reflected in the bills (Exhibit ES-1). 
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Exhibit ES-1. Projected Savings and Effectiveness of System Reform 
Provisions in House and Senate Reform Bills
2010–2019 (in billions)
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System Cost 
Containment 
Effectiveness
Cover preventive services and invest in community 
and employer prevention and wellness programs
Increase payment for primary care services
Institute value-based benefit design linked to 
comparative effectiveness research
Tax on premiums in excess of threshold
Level the playing field between Medicare Advantage 
plans and traditional Medicare coverage
Negotiate pharmaceutical prices
Require annual provider productivity improvements
Institute payment innovation to reward physicians 
and hospitals for value not volume
Public health insurance plan option
Establish a health insurance exchange with market 
rules; repeal antitrust exemption
Authors’ views of long-term effectiveness in controlling total health system spending: Very effective = +++, Effective = ++, 
Somewhat effective = +. Health Care Opinion Leaders Surveys: a Dec. 2008; b April 2009; c June 2009; d Oct. 2009.
Source: Commonwealth Fund estimates; Congressional Budget Office, Letter to the Honorable John D. Dingell, Nov. 20, 2009; 
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KEY PROVISIONS TARGETING COSTS AND QUALITY 
Following are the key changes that the House and Senate bills would make to help ensure 
long-run cost containment and improve the quality of health care. 
 
1. Changing the Insurance Market 
Both the House bill and the bill under consideration in the Senate would establish a 
health insurance exchange, or exchanges, with a choice of plans; rules to shift insurers 
from competing for healthier enrollees to competing on value; and greater transparency. 
While the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) does not credit savings that would be 
generated from increased competition among plans, it estimates that the insurance 
exchange would lower administrative overhead by four to five percentage points. In the 
authors’ view, the House provisions for the insurance exchange would be effective over 
the long term in mitigating the rise in premiums and costs to employers and households. 
These provisions include: creation of an 85 percent medical-loss ratio standard; 
standardized benefit tiers to facilitate comparison of plan premiums; review of plan 
premiums by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), who would have the 
authority to reject plans with excessive increases; and repeal of the health insurance 
companies’ exemption from antitrust regulation. These positive effects would grow if the 
exchange is gradually opened to larger firms (an option after the year 2015 in the House 
bill, and after 2017 in the Senate bill). According to a recent Commonwealth Fund survey 
of health care opinion leaders, support for establishment of a health insurance exchange is 
overwhelming (92%). 
 
2. Offering a Public Plan 
The House bill would offer a public health plan in the insurance exchange. The HHS 
secretary would be charged with negotiating provider payment rates and authorized to use 
an array of proven value-based purchasing payment methods. Providers participating in 
Medicare would be assumed to participate in the public health insurance plan unless they 
opt out. CBO estimates that the public plan will have lower administrative costs than 
private plans but also will attract sicker individuals, with the net effect that its premium 
will be slightly higher than those for private plans. The CBO estimates that nearly all of 
the 6 million people who enroll in the public plan (of the nearly 30 million covered 
through the exchange) would be people who are currently uninsured and who would be 
eligible for premium subsidies. 
 
The Senate bill includes a community health insurance option that is publicly 
sponsored and negotiates provider payment rates up to the average commercial level. 
Individual states would be allowed to opt out of offering the option. CBO estimates that 
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approximately one of eight people purchasing coverage through the exchange would 
choose a public plan. This would represent roughly 1.5 percent of the 282 million 
nonelderly people living in the United States in 2019, or about 4 million people. 
 
There is great uncertainty over the long-term effectiveness of the public plan 
option. Initially, health care providers that treat the uninsured are likely to participate, 
even at payment rates well below commercial rates because most of those newly  
covered would be low-income patients for whom safety-net providers now receive  
little or no payment. 
 
A Commonwealth Fund study found that a health reform proposal that includes a 
robust public health insurance plan—with provider payment tied to Medicare and open to 
all employers and individuals—could save $3 trillion in total health expenditures over the 
period 2010 to 2020. The same proposal, but with an intermediate public plan having 
rates between commercial providers’ and Medicare’s, was estimated to save $2 trillion. A 
proposal with no public plan but with Medicare reforms only, meanwhile, saved an 
estimated $1.2 trillion. Depending on how effective the HHS secretary is in negotiating 
rates and lowering administrative costs, the public plan could put significant pressure on 
private insurers to slow the growth in premiums for employers and workers over time as 
the exchange is opened to larger firms. Three-fourths of surveyed health care opinion 
leaders support inclusion of a public health insurance option in the exchange. 
 
3. Instituting Provider Payment Reform 
The House and Senate bills would establish a Medicare and Medicaid Payment 
Innovation Center with broad authority for the HHS secretary to test innovative payment 
methods for medical homes that provide patient-centered coordinated care, for 
accountable care organizations that assume responsibility for quality and cost across the 
continuum of patient care, and for bundled hospital acute and post-acute care. The Senate 
bill also would implement a national, voluntary shared savings program for accountable 
care organizations. The secretary would have broad authority to sustain and spread 
effective payment methods, although participation by providers in new payment methods 
would be voluntary. 
 
The House bill calls for two studies to be conducted by the Institute of Medicine. 
The secretary would be authorized to implement the recommendations of one study, on 
geographic adjustment factors in Medicare payment. The secretary also would be 
authorized to implement the recommendations of the second study, on geographic 
variation in health spending and promotion of high-value health care in Medicare, unless 
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Congress votes to disapprove it. Nearly all health care opinion leaders (97%) in the 
Commonwealth Fund survey support reforming provider payment to promote quality  
and efficiency. 
 
4. Adjusting Payment for Productivity Improvement 
The hospital industry agreed to slow increases in Medicare payment rates in recognition 
of the increased revenue realized through covering more uninsured Americans and the 
potential for significant ongoing productivity improvements. The one-percentage-point 
slowing in Medicare payment rates for all health care providers (other than physicians, 
whose payments are considered separately) yields $150 billion to $180 billion federal 
budget savings over 2010 to 2019, according to CBO, and establishes the principle that 
rising expenditures cannot continue at projected rates. 
 
5. Creating an Independent Medicare Advisory Board 
The Senate bill would establish an independent Medicare advisory board within the 
executive branch that has significant authority to identify areas of waste and additional 
federal budget savings. The board would first review physician and home health services; 
hospitals would be exempt initially. Congress would be required to make an up-or-down 
vote on its annual recommendations. CBO estimates the board would generate $23 billion 
in savings over 2010 to 2019, mostly in the out-years. Three-fourths of health care 
opinion leaders (75%) support creation of an independent advisory council that has the 
authority to make decisions within parameters established by Congress and subject to 
review by the president and Congress. 
 
6. Negotiating Pharmaceutical Prices 
The House bill calls for negotiating pharmaceutical prices and for increased prescription 
drug rebates for beneficiaries covered by both Medicare and Medicaid. The Senate bill 
includes rebates, but not negotiation of pharmaceutical prices—the result of an agreement 
among the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the White House, and the 
pharmaceutical industry, in which the industry agreed to provide discounts of half the 
cost of brand-name drugs in the Medicare coverage gap, or “doughnut hole.” While CBO 
does not score savings from the authority to negotiate prices, the experience of other 
countries suggests that it could in fact yield substantial savings were it to be included in a 
final reform bill. Four-fifths of health care opinion leaders (81%) favor using Medicare’s 
leverage to negotiate pharmaceutical drug prices. 
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7. Incentivizing Primary Care and Prevention 
The House and Senate bills include a number of provisions to increase primary care 
payment rates under Medicare and Medicaid, cover effective preventive services without 
patient cost-sharing, and support community and employer prevention and wellness 
programs. These provisions could begin to change the orientation of our health system 
toward primary care and away from specialty care, counter the impending shortage of 
primary care providers, and lay the groundwork for more fundamental payment reforms. 
 
8. Utilizing Value-Based Benefit Design 
Both the House and Senate bills contain provisions that would permit patient cost-sharing 
and payment rates to be modified to encourage the use of services that promote health 
and value. The House bill allows value-based benefit design in the public health 
insurance plan, while insurance plans that reduce or eliminate cost-sharing for clinically 
beneficial care are exempt from certain requirements under the Senate proposal. These 
approaches could begin to reduce the use of overpriced and/or ineffective services and 
procedures over time. Eighty-six percent of health care opinion leaders favor granting an 
independent Medicare advisory council the authority to alter beneficiary incentives based 
on the effectiveness of services, drugs, and devices. 
 
9. Promoting Quality Improvement and Public Reporting 
The Senate bill would reduce payment for hospital-acquired conditions, and both the 
House and Senate bills would enhance public reporting of quality and cost. Under the 
Senate proposal, hospitals with high rates of hospital-acquired conditions would have 
their Medicare reimbursement rates cut by 1 percent. The House bill would require all 
hospitals to publicly report their infection rates. 
 
10. Encouraging Medicare Private Plan Competition 
Both the House and Senate bills would level the playing field between Medicare private 
plans and the traditional Medicare public health insurance plan. This would yield $140 
billion to $170 billion in federal budget savings over 2010 to 2019, according to CBO. 
Moreover, this policy change could provider further impetus for plans to compete on 
value, creating at least some downward pressure on health care costs. Three-fourths of 
health care opinion leaders (77%) support such a provision. 
 
ASSESSING THE BILLS’ POTENTIAL IMPACT 
Consistent with the President’s belief that health reform should be financially sustainable 
and not add to the federal deficit, both the Senate and the House bills offset the cost of 
 x
expanding and improving coverage with a mixture of system savings and new  
revenue sources. 
 
According to CBO, the total net impact of the Senate bill on the federal budget 
deficit is a reduction of $130 billion over the 10-year period 2010 to 2019. This figure 
reflects the net federal costs of expanding coverage ($748 billion), offset by reductions in 
health system spending ($491 billion) as well as new revenues ($387 billion). Under the 
House bill, the total net impact on the federal budget deficit in the 10-year period 2010 to 
2019 is a reduction of $138 billion. This figure reflects the net federal costs of expanding 
coverage of $891 billion, offset by reductions in health system spending of $456 billion 
and by increased total revenue of $574 billion. 
 
Federal reforms have the potential to produce substantial total health system 
savings for the nation—well beyond what is reflected in the estimated federal budget 
impact. The combined effect of these provisions on trends in national health 
expenditures, however, is difficult to estimate, and CBO has indicated that it does not 
have the modeling capacity to do so. Estimates released by the Office of the Actuary at 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) indicate that the legislation could 
produce modest increases in national health expenditures, but this estimate gives little 
credit for savings to measures that would reform provider payment, negotiate prescription 
drug prices, increase competition among plans in an insurance exchange, encourage 
public reporting, or apply the results of comparative effectiveness research. Yet these 
measures are a crucial platform for developing and implementing further policies to 
contain health care cost growth. As such, they have broad support from health care 
opinion leaders and business leaders as effective ways to control costs. A recent analysis 
by the Business Roundtable prepared by Hewitt, for example, found that such legislative 
reforms could potentially reduce the trend line in employment-based health care spending 
by $3,000 per employee by 2019. 
 
CBO’s estimates of federal budget impact, however, are also fraught with 
uncertainty, given the multitude of changes and their potentially synergistic effects. On 
the last three occasions when CBO has estimated the savings or costs of major health 
reforms (the 1982–83 Medicare changes in hospital payment, the 1997 Balanced Budget 
Act, and the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act covering prescription drugs), the 
estimates were wide of the mark—with savings more than double those estimated in the 
first two cases and costs overstated by 40 percent in the third. 
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The measures incorporated in the bills under consideration would stimulate 
significant changes in the organization and delivery of health services and create 
powerful incentives to improve efficiency and productivity. Given the uncertainties that 
now exist, however, it will be especially important to establish a system for monitoring 
progress on agreed-upon health reform goals and to provide a mechanism for mid-course 
corrections and further changes as needed to move the United States toward a high 
performance health system by 2020. Stronger measures may be required over time to 
move providers toward value-based methods of payment. Estimates of cost and savings 
could be seriously underestimated or overestimated; if so, corrective actions may  
be required. 
 
Even under current estimates, 18 million to 24 million people will remain 
uninsured, and many others will still face financial barriers to obtaining needed care or 
hardship in paying premiums or medical bills. Additional steps may be required to ensure 
affordability for families as well as stable financing. 
 
Finally, the one major disappointment in the proposed health reform bills is the 
absence of significant incentives or levers for private insurers to control health care costs. 
Private insurers, in opposing a public plan, essentially have argued that they do not have 
the ability to slow premium growth or achieve economies, because of demands for higher 
prices from a powerful and increasingly consolidated health care provider sector. It is 
important that the HHS secretary use new discretionary authority to test multipayer 
provider payment reforms and to be responsive to requests from states or local groups to 
test innovative multipayer approaches. Over time, as experience is gained with new 
provider payment methods, strategies for harmonizing public and private provider 
payment and leveraging their joint purchasing power will be needed to avoid having 
public and private provider incentives working at cross-purposes. 
 
Congress has a historic opportunity to pass comprehensive health care reform 
legislation this year. Multiple strategies for improving quality and slowing the growth in 
total health system spending will help spark economic recovery, put the nation back on 
the road to fiscal responsibility, and ensure that families are able to get the care they need 
while having financial security and relief from rising insurance premiums. 
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STARTING ON THE PATH TO A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYSTEM: 
ANALYSIS OF HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM PROVISIONS OF 
REFORM BILLS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE 
 
 
The test of health reform should be whether it puts the United States on a path  
to a high performance health system with better access, improved quality, and greater 
efficiency. Extending coverage to all—as essential as it is to ensuring access, quality, and 
efficiency—is not sufficient to achieve value for health spending and slow the growth in 
health care costs. Instead, becoming a high performance health system requires fundamental 
reforms in the organization, delivery, and financing of health care, as well as investment 
in the capacity and infrastructure to reach attainable goals on health outcomes, quality, 
access, equity, and efficiency. 
 
This report analyzes those elements of the health reform proposals passed by the 
U.S. House of Representatives and under consideration in the Senate that will affect 
health care providers’ financial incentives, the organization and delivery of health 
services, investment in prevention and population health, and the capacity to achieve the 
best care and outcomes for all. For more details on the provisions in the bills passed by 
the House of Representatives and under consideration by the Senate, see the recent 
Commonwealth Fund report summarizing those provisions pertinent to achieving a high 
performance health system.1 In addition, a companion to this report analyzes the extent to 
which the bill passed by the House and the proposal under consideration in the Senate 
would cover the uninsured and ensure affordability of coverage and care for all.2
 
STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF HEALTH REFORM 
President Obama has stressed three major goals of health reform: ensuring stability and 
security of health insurance coverage for those who have it, providing insurance for those 
who do not, and slowing the rise in health care costs for employers, families, and 
government. He has taken a pragmatic approach, building on what works and fixing what 
does not, while signaling his openness to the best ideas from all sources. Congress has 
taken unprecedented steps toward passing comprehensive reform that achieves these 
goals and moves the health system down the path to high performance. 
 
The proposals fashioned by Congress embrace the five essential strategies for 
comprehensive health system reform set forth by The Commonwealth Fund Commission 
on a High Performance Health System in the February 2009 report, The Path to a High 
Performance Health System.3 These include: 
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• extending affordable coverage for all; 
• aligning incentives to enhance value and achieve savings; 
• organizing care delivery systems to ensure accountable, accessible, patient-
centered, coordinated care; 
• meeting and raising benchmarks for better health outcomes, higher quality,  
and greater efficiency; and 
• ensuring accountable leadership and public–private collaboration to set and 
achieve national goals. 
 
THE NEED FOR HEALTH REFORM 
The need for health reform is compelling. The recent State Scorecard on Health System 
Performance issued by the Commonwealth Fund Commission has documented twofold 
to threefold variation within the United States on indicators of access, quality, equity, 
cost, and health outcomes.4 It concluded that national reform is needed to raise 
performance in all areas of the U.S. to the best achievable levels. 
 
Addressing the rising cost of health care and wide variation in quality throughout 
the U.S. requires that reforms go beyond expanding coverage to transforming the health 
system through information, rewards, and assistance with meeting benchmark levels of 
performance. Slowing the growth in health care costs is particularly urgent in the current 
economic crisis. The cost of health care in the U.S.—higher than anywhere else in the 
world and rising faster than our gross domestic product—is taking its toll on families, 
employers, and government. U.S. health care spending is more than twice the per-person 
spending of other major industrialized countries, with costs projected to continue to rise 
rapidly over the next decade (Exhibit 1). Health care already consumes 17 percent of the 
nation’s economy, and will reach 21 percent by 2020 if trends continue.5
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Exhibit 1. National Health Expenditures per Capita, 1980–2007
Data: OECD Health Data 2009 (June 2009).
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With increases regularly exceeding economic growth, ever-higher health spending 
has directly contributed to stagnating or declining incomes for middle-class families and 
workers.6 Family health insurance premiums under employer plans have risen from 11 
percent of family income in 1999 to 18 percent today, undermining wage increases and 
family financial security.7 If we continue on our current course, premiums will reach  
24 percent by 2020. 
 
Economists differentiate between those factors that cause the level of health care 
costs to vary across the U.S. or across countries and those factors that drive the rate of 
increase in costs.8 Addressing the first problem may yield one-time savings that shift the 
cost curve downward but continue at the same rate of growth. Addressing the latter will 
permanently bend the cost curve downward. One-time savings, however, lead to 
permanently lower costs over time, and a series of one-time savings year after year 
reduces the slope of the curve. Just as productivity improvements of 1 percent a year fuel 
economic growth, annual productivity improvements or reductions in waste would have a 
marked impact on slowing the growth in health care costs. It is important to understand 
the sources of each type of savings and fashion policies that will reduce cost growth both 
immediately and over time. 
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One-time savings are likely to derive from approaches that address factors 
contributing to current high levels of U.S. expenditures, inefficiency, and waste. These 
factors include: 
 
• overuse, inappropriate use, or ineffective use of care; 
• payment incentives that reward the delivery of more services and more intensive 
services, without considering clinical value or cost-effectiveness; 
• market power of insurers, providers, and the health industry—including 
pharmaceutical companies, device manufacturers, and other suppliers—to set 
prices above what would be competitive levels; 
• a low ratio of primary to specialty care physicians and services; 
• access barriers to preventive and primary care that contribute to avoidable 
hospital admissions, emergency department use, and complications of chronic  
and acute disease; 
• a lack of coordination that leads to unsafe, duplicative, or conflicting care; 
• inadequate information systems and information exchange; and 
• high administrative costs, including the high proportion of insurance premiums 
devoted to overhead costs, the complexity of insurance benefit design and 
duplicative and uncoordinated requirements, and the resulting administrative  
costs for providers. 
 
The principal factors that contribute to long-term trends in rising expenditures that 
might be amenable to policy change are somewhat different. They include: 
 
• introduction of new technologies and innovations without comparative information 
on clinical outcomes or cost-effectiveness to guide decisions on adoption and use; 
• lack of an effective market for provider-purchased goods and provider services, 
leading to price inflation; 
• growing market power and consolidation of insurers, providers, and the health 
industry—including pharmaceutical companies, device manufacturers, and other 
suppliers—contributing to less choice and higher prices; and 
• the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases. 
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Some of these factors are desirable, such as medical research that discovers new 
cures and new technologies that extend and improve the quality of life. Other factors, 
such as the rise in chronic disease, are difficult to address. Though specific policies 
targeting such factors may be warranted, such policies may not have large short-term or 
near-term effects on the costs of care. 
 
The keys to long-run cost containment that can be most effectively addressed in 
health reform include: 
 
• Changing the insurance market 
– Establish a health insurance exchange with choice, rules,  
and transparency. 
• Offering a public plan 
– Transform competitiveness of insurance markets with public  
health insurance plan option. 
– Leverage purchasing power to obtain fair and reasonable rates  
of provider payment. 
• Instituting provider payment reform 
– Institute payment innovation to reward physicians and hospitals  
for value and safety, not volume. 
• Adjusting payment for productivity improvement 
– Require ongoing provider productivity improvements by  
limiting payment updates. 
• Creating an independent Medicare advisory board 
– Establish an independent commission to identify and correct  
overpriced services and wasteful practices and harmonize public  
and private payer policies to enhance value. 
• Negotiating pharmaceutical prices 
• Incentivizing primary care and prevention 
– Strengthen prevention and primary care through changes in  
payment rates. 
– Develop models that emphasize population health needs and  
coordinated care. 
• Utilizing value-based benefit design 
– Institute value-based benefit design linked to comparative  
effectiveness research and information to patients and clinicians. 
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• Promoting quality improvement and public reporting 
– Publicly report total price, quality, and outcomes for treatment of 
conditions, services, procedures, devices, and pharmaceutical products. 
• Encouraging Medicare private plan competition 
– Require private plans to compete with traditional Medicare public 
coverage on quality and responsiveness to beneficiary needs. 
 
Most of these strategies are included in health reform proposals under 
consideration. Taken together, they would achieve savings to offset the federal budget 
cost of covering the uninsured and making coverage affordable for low- and moderate-
income families, and they would slow the growth of national health expenditures. One 
major cost-containment strategy not included in the congressional proposals is 
harmonizing public and private provider payment and gaining leverage from the 
combined purchasing power of private and public coverage through coordinated payment 
policies; this strategy would be an effective tool for aligning payment incentives with the 
goals of health reform systemwide. 
 
MAJOR HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM PROVISIONS IN THE 
CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS 
The following sections assess the extent to which provisions in the health reform 
proposals passed by the House of Representatives and under consideration in the Senate 
embody these strategies and recommendations, and are likely to be effective in achieving 
a high performance health system. They include key provisions on transforming the 
health insurance market; reforming provider payment and changing the health care 
delivery system; creating an independent Medicare advisory board to seek consensus and 
speed legislative action on measures to achieve savings and improve quality; changing 
patient incentives; improving quality and safety; and fostering greater competition on 
value between private plans and Medicare for coverage of Medicare beneficiaries. A 
summary of key provisions is contained in Exhibits 2 to 4, and more detailed descriptions 
of the provisions are available in a recent Commonwealth Fund report.9
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Exhibit 2. System Improvement Provisions of 
National Health Reform Proposals, 2009
Establish the Center for Quality Improvement 
to identify, develop, evaluate, disseminate, 
and implement best practices; develop 
national priorities for performance 
improvement and quality measures
Establish Center for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research within AHRQ
Develop a national prevention and wellness 
strategy; establish a Prevention and Wellness 
Trust Fund; remove cost-sharing for 
proven preventive services; grants to 
support employer wellness programs
Increase Medicare payments for 
PCPs by 5%; bring Medicaid PCPs 
up to Medicare level
Modify market-basket updates to 
account for productivity improvements
Adopt medical homes, ACOs, and 
bundled payments on large scale 
if pilot programs prove successful; 
Center for Payment Innovation
National or state exchanges; private, public, 
or co-op plans offered; essential health 
benefits 70%–95% actuarial value, four tiers; 
insurers must meet specified medical loss 
ratio of 85 percent
House of Representatives 
11/05/09
Direct HHS to develop national 
quality strategy, public reporting
Create Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute
Provide annual wellness visit and/or 
health risk assessment for Medicare 
beneficiaries; strengthen state and employer 
wellness programs; remove 
cost-sharing for proven preventive services
10% bonus payments for 5 years; half 
of the costs offset by across-the-board 
reduction in all other services
Modify market-basket updates to account for 
productivity improvements
Allow Medicaid beneficiaries to designate 
medical home; ACOs to share savings in 
Medicare; CMS Innovations Center
State or regional exchanges; 
private and co-op plans offered; 
public plan with state opt-out; 
essential health benefits 60%–90% 
actuarial value, four tiers plus 
young adults policy; insurers must 
report medical loss ratio
Senate
11/18/09
Productivity Improvements
Innovative Payment Pilots: Medical 
Homes, Accountable Care 
Organizations, Bundled Hospital and 
Post-Acute Care 
Exchange Standards and Plans
Prevention and Wellness
Quality Improvement
Comparative Effectiveness
Primary Care
Note: ACO = accountable care organization; PCP = primary care physician; AHRQ = Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality. HHS = Department of Health and Human Services
Source: Commonwealth Fund analysis.  
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Exhibit 3. System Reform Provisions of House Bill
• Health Insurance Exchange, Rules, and Choice of Public and Private Plans
– Health insurance exchange administrative savings for individuals and small businesses
– Public plan authorized to use new innovative payment methods; secretary of HHS 
negotiates rates
– Minimum Benefit Package; Review premium increases; 85 percent minimum medical loss ratio
• Change Provider Payment
– Rapid-cycle testing of innovative payment methods
• Medical homes
• Accountable care organizations
• Bundled payments for hospital and post-acute care
• Authority to spread in Medicare and incorporate in public plan
– Geographic variations: IOM study; Congressional up-or-down vote on recommendations
– Productivity improvement; reduction for high hospital readmissions
• Strengthen Prevention and Primary Care
– Improved coverage of preventive services and elimination of cost-sharing
– Enhanced payment for primary care: 5 percent overall, 10 percent in shortage areas
• Correct Overpriced Services and Plans
– Negotiation of pharmaceutical prices; prescription drug savings
– Resetting Medicare Advantage rates to fee-for-service levels with quality bonuses
• Center for Comparative Effectiveness and Value-Based Benefit Design
• Quality Improvement, Measurement and Public Reporting
• Medical Malpractice Demonstrations
• Repeal of Insurance Antitrust Exemption
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Exhibit 4. System Reform Provisions of Senate Bill
• Health Insurance Exchange and Rules
– Health insurance exchange administrative savings for individuals and small businesses
– Minimum benefit package; insurers must report minimum medical loss ratio
– Choice of private plans, consumer cooperative plans, and a public plan unless state opts out
• Strengthen Prevention and Primary Care
– Provide PCPs a 10% Medicare payment bonus for 5 years beginning in 2011
– Increase the number of GME training positions
– Establish a Workforce Advisory Committee to develop and implement a national 
workforce strategy
– Eliminate cost-sharing for annual wellness visits and evidence-based preventive services
• Change Provider Payment
– Rapid-cycle testing of innovative payment methods through CMS Innovations Center
• Medical homes
• Accountable care organizations
• Bundled payments for hospital and post-acute care
• Authority to spread in Medicare
– Productivity improvement; reduction for high hospital readmissions
– Restructure payments to Medicare Advantage plans
• Create a private, nonprofit Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
• Goals and Reporting
– Quality improvement, measurement, public reporting
– Health goals and priorities for performance improvement
Note: PCP = primary care physician.  
 
Changing the Insurance Market 
The reform proposals in both the House and the Senate would enhance value, lower 
administrative costs, and foster competition in the insurance market by creating a health 
insurance exchange to facilitate choice and promote competition for enrollees. The 
insurance exchange initially would be open to individuals and small businesses and could 
gradually be opened to larger firms. 
 
Under the Senate proposal, individuals and small businesses with up to 50 
employees would be eligible to purchase coverage in the exchange. Beginning in 2015, 
states must open the exchange to businesses with up to 100 employees, and may allow 
businesses with more than 100 employees to purchase coverage through the exchange 
beginning in 2017. Under the House bill, individuals who do not have access to employer 
coverage and who are not eligible for Medicaid may purchase coverage through the 
exchange. Employers with 25 or fewer employees would be eligible in the first year, 
those with 50 or fewer employees would be eligible in the second year, and those with 
100 or fewer employees would be eligible in the third year. Also in the third year, the 
commissioner of the exchange would have the authority to decide whether and when to 
open the exchange to larger firms. 
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All plans, whether offered through the exchange or independently, must meet 
certain standards, including open enrollment to all, regardless of health status, and 
community-rated premiums that do not vary with health status. Premiums can vary with 
age, but the spread is limited (to 2:1 between older and younger adults in the House 
version and 3:1 in the Senate version). The House bill also repeals the insurance industry 
McCarran–Ferguson exemption from the antitrust laws. 
 
In the insurance exchange, plans would offer standardized benefits within each of 
four tiers, making it easy to compare premiums for plans with comparable benefits. The 
House bill further requires plans to devote 85 percent of premiums to medical care, while 
the Senate bill would not set a standard but instead would require public reporting of 
these medical-loss ratios. Under the House bill, the insurance exchange would have the 
authority to review and reject premium increases. 
 
These provisions would increase the number of choices available to individuals 
and employees of small businesses and make their coverage more stable, since they could 
keep their health plan if they move from one firm to another firm participating in the 
exchange. Pooling risks across a larger group of individuals should also lower premiums. 
The Senate version would allow states to establish separate pools for individuals and 
small businesses, though states would have the option of establishing one exchange 
serving both individuals and small businesses, as long as separate resources were 
available to assist both. 
 
CBO estimates that the exchange would lower administrative overhead by four to 
five percentage points.10 These savings come primarily from eliminating underwriting 
and reducing reliance on insurance brokers to select plans. The ability to compare plans 
should increase competition and lead to lower premiums, although no savings are 
attributed by CBO to this dynamic. 
 
Offering a Public Health Insurance Plan 
In the House and Senate proposals, a public health insurance plan would be offered 
through the exchange, along with private plans meeting specified standards. The House 
bill would include a national public health insurance plan, administered by the HHS 
secretary, which negotiates provider payment rates. Further, the secretary would have 
discretion to use new payment methods that reward value, rather than the current fee-for-
service payment system. Medicare providers would be assumed to participate in the 
public plan unless they opt out. CBO estimates that the public plan in the House version 
would achieve administrative savings, pay providers at rates equivalent to those in private 
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plans, and attract sicker individuals compared with those in private plans. As a result, the 
public plan premium would be slightly above private plan premiums, and it would enroll 
approximately 6 million people, or one-fifth of the nearly 30 million covered through the 
exchange in 2019 (Exhibit 5).11
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Exhibit 5. Effect of House and Senate Bills on Insurance Coverage 
of People Under Age 65, 2019
(in millions)
Current law
Employer 
162 m
58%
Uninsured
54 m
19%
Nongroup
15 m
5%
Medicaid
35 m
12%
Other
16 m
6%
Employer 
159 m
56%
Uninsured
18 m
6%
Exchange–
Public
6 m
2%
Exchange–
Private
24 m
9%
Other
16 m
6%
Nongroup
9 m
3%
Medicaid
50 m
18%
House bill Senate bill
Employer 
152 m
53%
Uninsured
24 m
9%
Exchange–
Public
4 m
1%
Exchange–
Private
26 m
9%
Other
16 m
6%
Nongroup
10 m
4%
Medicaid
50 m
18%
Source: The Congressional Budget Office Preliminary Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10731. The Congressional Budget Office Analysis of H.R. 3962, 
The Affordable Health Care for America Act, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10741. 
 
 
The Senate bill includes a community health insurance option that is publicly 
sponsored and negotiates provider payment rates up to the average commercial level. 
Individual states would be allowed to opt out of offering the option. CBO estimates that 
about 4 million people, or approximately one-eighth of the 30 million people purchasing 
coverage through the exchange, would choose a public plan. This would represent about 
1.5 percent of the 282 million nonelderly people living in the United States in 2019. 
 
Health care opinion leaders have been broadly supportive of the establishment of 
a health insurance exchange with market rules and a public plan option. More than nine 
of 10 (92%) support allowing individuals who do not have coverage through their 
employers, Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program to purchase a plan 
through a national exchange.12 Seven of 10 (70%) favor giving the governing body of the 
exchange the authority to enforce standards of participation, standardize benefits, set 
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rating rules, and review or negotiate premiums.13 Meanwhile, 76 percent favor including 
a public plan option in an exchange so that individuals could choose between private and 
public plans.14
 
Instituting Provider Payment Reform 
Key to improving health care quality and achieving greater efficiency is changing the 
way in which providers are paid, to reward the delivery of higher quality and safer care 
and appropriate stewardship of resources. This would require moving away from the 
current fee-for-service payment system toward one that emphasizes the value rather than 
the volume of services provided, and fosters the growth of organizations that are 
accountable for offering accessible, well-coordinated, and patient-centered care that is 
responsive to patients’ needs and efficiently provided. While the House and the Senate 
bills do not immediately implement fundamental payment reform, they lay the 
groundwork for it through an intensive period of testing new payment and delivery 
system innovations. These payment innovations are supported by almost all health care 
opinion leaders (97%).15
 
Medical Homes 
The House bill calls for creation of a Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Center within 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that would be responsible for 
rapid-cycle testing of innovative payment models that provide high-quality and efficient 
care. It mandates a pilot program to test three models: one for independent patient-
centered medical homes, one for community-based medical homes, and one for home-
based primary care targeted at high-need beneficiaries. Further, it instructs the HHS 
secretary to adopt the medical home model on a large scale to the extent that it is found to 
be successful in improving quality and/or reducing costs, as determined by the CMS chief 
actuary, and to incorporate successful payment methods in the public plan offered 
through the insurance exchange. 
 
The Senate similarly calls for creation of a center within CMS to disseminate 
innovations that foster patient-centered care coordination for high-cost, chronically ill 
Medicare beneficiaries. It also gives states the option of allowing Medicaid beneficiaries 
with chronic conditions to designate a provider as a health home. Qualified providers 
would be required to report applicable quality data. The bill would provide grants for 
improving health system efficiency, including grants to establish community health teams 
to support a medical home model. 
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These provisions would move the U.S. toward a delivery system in which 
everyone has a personal source of care that is accessible, coordinates care, and is 
accountable for obtaining the best health results. To achieve such a system, it will be 
important to give patients a financial incentive to designate a personal source of care and 
to reward physician practices serving as medical homes.16 Savings from this model—for 
example from reduced numbers of avoidable hospitalizations and emergency room 
visits—should be distributed to medical homes on the basis of provider performance. 
 
CBO does not attribute savings to the medical home payment pilots.17 RAND 
researchers, however, have found that while medical homes are unlikely to produce 
substantial savings, they could have a synergistic effect when combined with the use of 
health information technology and other reforms.18
 
Accountable Care Organizations 
Coordinating care across the continuum of health care services is most easily 
accomplished within a larger organization that directly provides those services and/or has 
contractual relationships with providers to deliver some subset of services. For example, 
a multispecialty physician group practice that includes primary and specialty care can 
coordinate care through a common electronic information system that shares medical 
records among providers, a scheduling system that facilitates prompt and easy referral to 
specialists, and timely and effective communication among physicians caring for a 
patient with complex health conditions. An integrated delivery system including one or 
more hospitals and a multispecialty physician group practice can ensure effective 
transitions between inpatient and outpatient care. 
 
To qualify as such, the Senate requires that accountable care organization (ACOs) 
include providers and suppliers with a mechanism for joint decision-making who agree to 
be responsible for the overall care of their Medicare beneficiaries, coordinate care and 
meet certain quality thresholds, and report on quality and cost measures. If an ACO does 
not include a hospital or long-term care facility, it will need to contract with such 
organizations and ensure smooth transitions, effective communication, and continuity 
across the continuum of care. 
 
Medical homes and ACOs are complementary models of care delivery.19 The 
medical home emphasizes primary care that is patient-centered, delivered in practice 
settings with 21st-century infrastructure, and based on evidence-based processes. The 
ACO is a larger provider organization that is willing to deliver or manage the full 
continuum of care and be accountable for the overall costs and outcomes of care for its 
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defined population. ACOs provide an organizational structure that enables providers to 
contract with payers to align financial incentives with the goal of improving clinical 
performance, slowing the growth in spending, and achieving better outcomes and greater 
efficiency. High-performing primary care is critical to the success of an ACO. These 
complementary and mutually reinforcing models can work together to meet the goals of 
health reform—achieving better quality and slowing the rate of health care spending. 
 
The House bill would launch Medicare and Medicaid pilot programs to test 
payment incentive models for ACOs and would spread these models broadly, if the pilot 
programs reduce costs without reducing quality. Full capitation payment, with rewards 
for delivering high-quality care, would provide strong incentives for ACOs to be prudent 
stewards of resources, while still being accountable for their patients’ health outcomes 
and quality of care. The experience with capitated contracts under managed care plans in 
the 1990s, however, has made many physician group practices and health care 
organizations wary of assuming insurance risk for factors beyond their control. 
 
More attractive to providers are payment methods that provide shared savings for 
ACOs that slow the growth in Medicare outlays below a target rate. This is the basic 
model in the Medicare physician group practice demonstration, which provides “upside” 
rewards for productivity and efficiency gains, without the “downside” financial risk of a 
fixed premium, which could lead to losses if expenses exceed premium revenues. The 
Senate bill includes a national voluntary program under which ACOs can share in savings 
they generate for Medicare over a span of three years. 
 
Flexibility for the HHS secretary to test a variety of shared-risk and shared-
savings models would provide much-needed evidence and experience and would form 
the basis for future payment reforms. The House bill requires the secretary to set targets 
for provider participation levels in both the ACO and medical home models that are 
sufficient to ensure sufficient scale for determining the potential for broader success of 
the models. In addition, the secretary would have the authority to extend or expand the 
pilots if they prove successful at reducing costs or improving quality. 
 
In addition, ACOs that have or develop insurance products, or partner with 
insurance plans to offer a choice of enrollment in their systems of care through the 
insurance exchange, stand to gain market share if they are able to provide high-quality 
care more efficiently than their competitors. Under the Path proposal advanced by the 
Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System, such 
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insurance products would be available on a regional basis through the national health 
insurance exchange, thus expanding their market substantially beyond what now prevails.20
 
CBO estimates that the accountable care organization pilot program included in 
the House bill will save $2.6 billion over the 10 years from 2010 to 2019.21 In the Senate 
bill, providing ACOs with shared savings is estimated by CBO to save $4.9 billion over 
that period.22
 
Bundled Payment for Acute-Care Episodes 
Hospital readmission rates and post-acute care expenses vary widely from hospital to 
hospital.23 Avoidable hospital readmissions are both undesirable for patients and costly 
for the system. Approximately $12 billion a year could be saved by reducing the number 
of avoidable hospital readmissions.24
 
New payment methods applied to acute-care episodes (including the hospital stay 
plus 30 days after discharge) would encourage hospitals and other providers to 
collaborate in developing the capacity to improve care transitions and reduce the number 
of avoidable hospitalizations. Bundling payment for the initial hospitalization and follow-
on care would reward providers that achieve fewer complications, better transitional care, 
and lower total expenditures for hospitalization of patients with acute episodes. Under the 
current fee-for-service payment system, such providers stand to lose. 
 
The House bill would reduce Medicare payments for potentially preventable 
hospital readmissions, at an estimated savings of $9 billion over 2010 to 2019.25 It 
authorizes the HHS secretary to conduct Medicare pilot programs to test payment 
incentive models for bundling of post-acute care payments. The new Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation would develop and implement payment models targeted at 
populations that experience poor clinical outcomes or avoidable expenditures, and it 
would have the authority to expand those models found to improve quality without 
increasing spending, reduce spending without reducing quality, or both. 
 
The Senate bill calls for development of a voluntary pilot program to encourage 
hospitals, doctors, and post-acute-care providers to achieve savings for Medicare through 
better collaboration and coordination, allowing providers to share in the savings. It would 
reduce payments for hospitals with high readmission rates if patients are rehospitalized 
for three conditions for which there are risk-adjusted readmission measures endorsed by 
the National Quality Forum. The secretary would have the authority to expand the policy 
to additional conditions in future years. The bill also creates a Community Care 
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Transitions Program to fund eligible hospitals and community-based organizations that 
provide patient-centered, evidence-based transitional care services to Medicare 
beneficiaries at highest risk of preventable rehospitalization. The Senate bill requires 
hospitals to report preventable readmission rates for certain conditions. 
 
Bringing all providers under the same payment umbrella would encourage 
communication and collaboration between physicians and hospitals. Having a pilot-
testing period would give providers time to prepare for the new system and Medicare 
time to develop rates that reflect the cost of efficient provision of various bundles of care. 
Giving the HHS secretary authority to spread successful payment models broadly in 
Medicare—and, in the case of the House bill, adopt those methods in a new public  
health insurance plan—would go a long way toward changing financial incentives to 
reward results. 
 
RAND estimates that one bundled-payment approach (the Prometheus model), if 
used for six chronic and four acute conditions, has the potential to reduce national health 
expenditures by 5.4 percent between 2010 and 2019.26
 
Pay–for-Performance 
The Senate bill would begin to establish a value-based purchasing program to pay 
hospitals based on their performance on quality measures. Hospitals with high rates of 
hospital-acquired conditions also would have their Medicare reimbursement rates cut by 
1 percent. It also would establish a physician value-based purchasing program to improve 
on the current Physician Quality Reporting Initiative. The program would reward 
physicians who participate beginning in 2011 and penalize those who are eligible but do 
not participate by 2014. It would establish payment incentives to encourage appropriate 
use of high-cost imaging services, expand the Medicare physician feedback program, and 
penalize physicians who use significantly more resources than their peers. 
 
Geographic Disparities 
There are wide variations across the United States in the cost and quality of care, yet 
there is no systematic relationship between the two.27 Providers in some geographic areas 
provide high-quality care at lower cost, while providers in other areas have Medicare 
expenditures per beneficiary that are twice as high as similar geographic areas—without 
better quality or patient outcomes.28 The House bill calls for two studies by the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM). One of these studies is to examine geographic adjustments to the 
Medicare payment rates for hospital and physician services; the HHS secretary would be 
authorized to implement the IOM recommendations without congressional action, with 
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$4 billion for each of two years set aside for this purpose. In addition, the IOM would be 
charged with addressing geographic variation in spending by studying the desirability of 
changing Medicare payment to reward quality. Again, the secretary would be authorized 
to implement the IOM’s recommendations, unless disapproved by Congress. The Senate 
bill modifies the adjustments to the Medicare fee schedule that are intended to reflect 
geographic differences in the cost of resources needed to produce physician services: 
physician work, practice expenses, and medical malpractice insurance. Medicare payment 
also would be linked to quality of care under the Senate bill (see below). 
 
Physician Fee Update 
The Senate bill would replace the scheduled 21 percent reduction in 2010 with a 0.5 
percent increase, for one year only, at a budget cost of $11 billion. The House bill does 
not address this issue; instead, a companion bill (H.R. 3961, the Medicare Physician 
Payment Reform Act of 2009) passed by the House on November 19, 2009, would 
replace the current methodology (the so-called sustainable growth rate formula) that in 
recent years has produced across-the-board annual cuts in Medicare physician fees 
(which have been superseded by Congress each year) with a new methodology. 
 
The methodology proposed by the House would apply annual updates separately 
to two categories of physician services: 1) preventive care and evaluation and 
management services; and 2) specialized procedures and services. Fees would be 
increased each year according to the rate of growth in the gross domestic product (GDP), 
plus 2 percentage points for prevention and evaluation and management services, and the 
GDP growth rate, plus 1 percentage point for specialized procedures and services. This 
new methodology for updating physician fees is estimated by CBO to add $210 billion to 
federal budget outlays over 2010 to 2019.29
 
Adjusting Payment for Productivity Improvement 
The major hospital associations entered into an agreement with the Obama administration 
to save $155 billion in Medicare outlays over the period 2010 to 2019.30 They proposed 
that this be achieved by lowering the projected Medicare increases in hospital payment 
by 1 percentage point a year and phasing out a portion of disproportionate share 
payments to hospitals as the uninsured receive coverage. This agreement reflects an 
understanding that the hospital sector can improve productivity and that it will be the 
beneficiary of increased payments for the uninsured and reduced bad debt. The 
Commonwealth Fund Commission’s Path report also included an adjustment to payments 
for annual hospital productivity improvements of 1 percent, with the view that new 
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methods of payment would provide an opportunity to reduce complications, shorten 
lengths of stay, and reduce hospital readmissions.31
 
The House bill incorporates the productivity improvement allowance of  
1 percentage point across all Medicare services (other than physician services, which are 
considered separately). These productivity improvement requirements and other payment 
update changes yield a 10-year budget savings of $177 billion from 2010 to 2019 in the 
House and $154 billion in the Senate bill, according to CBO (Exhibit 6).32 Changes to 
Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments would yield $20 billion 
in savings over the same time period in the House bill and $43 billion in the Senate bill. 
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Exhibit 6. House and Senate Payment and System Reform Savings, 
2010–2019
Dollars in billions
58
—
–55
–75
–20
–9
–2
–6
–170
–177
–$456
CBO estimate of 
House bill
–88
–23
–42
6
–43
–7
–8
4
–136
–154
–$491
CBO estimate of 
Senate bill 
Total Savings from Payment and System Reforms
• Other improvements and interactions
• Prescription drugs
• Home health
• Disproportionate share hospital adjustment
• Hospital readmissions
• Independent Commission
• Payment innovations
• Primary care, geographic adjustment
• Medicare Advantage reform
• Productivity improvement/provider payment updates
Source: The Congressional Budget Office Preliminary Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10731. The Congressional Budget Office Analysis of H.R. 3962, 
The Affordable Health Care for America Act, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10741. 
 
 
Creating an Independent Medicare Advisory Board 
In his address to Congress, President Obama called for creation of an independent 
commission to identify and spread best practices that achieve savings and eliminate 
waste. The Senate bill establishes an Independent Medicare Advisory Board with a 
mandate to make payment decisions within parameters established by Congress and 
subject to review by the president and Congress. It is intended to slow the rate of 
Medicare spending growth and enhance the long-term financial solvency of the program. 
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However, the levers available to the board are sharply circumscribed. Recommendations 
could not pertain to benefits or eligibility and, at least in the beginning, exclude the major 
providers, such as hospitals. 
 
Authority for the new board might appropriately be broadened to enable it to 
harmonize public and private payer payment policies and leverage purchasing power 
across the health system to reduce national health expenditures. Currently, private insurer 
pricing is often chaotic; for health care markets to work properly, payment incentives 
need to be aligned across payers, with consistent goals for health care quality and 
efficiency.33 Seventy-five percent of health care opinion leaders in the Commonwealth 
Fund survey favor the creation of an independent Medicare advisory council that has the 
authority to make payment and benefit design decisions within parameters established by 
Congress and subject to review by the president and Congress.34 Nearly nine of 10 (89%) 
leaders favor granting such a council the authority to collaborate in multipayer initiatives 
that include Medicare, private payers, and Medicaid, and 79 percent support allowing an 
independent council to develop policies that could be applied by Congress not only to 
Medicare, but also to Medicaid and other payers to align incentives across the health  
care system. 
 
Negotiating Pharmaceutical Prices 
Pharmaceutical costs account for more than 10 percent of Medicare outlays, and they 
have been among the most rapidly rising components of national health expenditures.35 
In the U.S., prices for many brand-name drugs are higher than in other countries, and 
Americans take more medications.36 As a result, U.S. pharmaceutical spending per capita 
is among the highest in the world.37
 
The House bill would require the HHS secretary to negotiate directly with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to lower drug prices for Medicare standalone Part D plans 
and Medicare Advantage Part D plans. CBO does not attribute any savings to this 
provision. The House bill also would require drug manufacturers to provide rebates for 
“dual-eligibles” (those individuals eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid) who are 
enrolled in part D plans, and would increase the Medicaid drug rebate percentage and 
extend the prescription drug rebate to Medicaid managed care plans. It requires 
disclosure of financial relationships among health entities (e.g., among physicians and 
drug companies). More than eight of 10 (81%) health care opinion leaders favor using 
Medicare’s leverage to negotiate pharmaceutical drug prices.38
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Setting the price at the average global price for single-source drugs for which 
there are no therapeutic alternatives (i.e., noncompeting single-source drugs), a category 
for which private drug plan and Medicare Advantage drug plan negotiation has  
been relatively unsuccessful, would be particularly deserving of inclusion in the  
final legislation.39
 
The Senate would require pharmaceutical and device manufacturers to disclose 
payments and incentives to providers. It would increase the Medicaid drug rebate 
percentage, increase the Medicaid rebate for non-innovator, multiple-source drugs, and 
extend the prescription drug rebate to Medicaid managed care plans. As part of an 
agreement between the pharmaceutical industry, the White House, and the chairman of 
the Senate Finance Committee, the industry would provide a 50 percent discount on 
brand-name prescriptions for enrollees in the Medicare Part D coverage gap, or 
“doughnut hole,” except for those who receive low-income subsidies and those with 
higher incomes.40 The Senate bill would also require pharmaceutical benefit managers to 
disclose discounts negotiated with drug makers and pass on savings to consumers. 
 
Incentivizing Primary Care and Prevention 
Easy access to basic medical care is key to both better patient outcomes and lower 
costs.41 Yet the U.S. health care system disproportionately rewards specialty care, which 
in recent years has contributed to a sharp decrease in newly trained physicians who elect 
primary care practice.42 Rectifying the imbalance between primary and specialty care 
compensation is essential to reversing this trend. 
 
The House bill includes a 5 percent payment bonus for evaluation and 
management services (i.e., office visits) and other services associated with ensuring 
accessible, continuous, coordinated, and comprehensive care when provided by a 
physician or other practitioner who specializes in family medicine, general internal 
medicine, general pediatrics, or geriatrics and for whom primary care represents a 
majority of his or her practice income. It provides an additional 5 percent allowance for 
practice in areas where there is a shortage of health professionals. Medicaid fees for 
primary care services, under both fee-for-service payment and managed care plans, 
would be raised to Medicare levels over a three-year period. 
 
The Senate bill seeks to strengthen primary care by providing 10 percent bonus 
payments to primary care providers (and general surgeons) for five years, half of which is 
offset by across-the-board reductions in all other services. In addition, the Senate bill 
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strengthens chronic care management by providing reimbursement for certain care 
management activities for patients with hospital stays related to a major chronic condition.43
 
These increases in payments for primary care and chronic care management are 
an important step toward addressing the imbalance in payment incentives that reward 
specialized procedures over primary care. A substantial majority (61%) of health care 
opinion leaders feel that increasing the supply of primary care providers through payment 
reform would be an effective strategy for reducing the growth in health care costs.44 
Favored policies include raising payments for primary care services, providing additional 
payments for providers who serve as a patient-centered medical home accountable for 
quality and efficiency, rewarding providers for high-quality and coordinated care, and 
offering incentives that encourage patients to enroll in medical homes. 
 
The House and Senate bills would improve the coverage of preventive services by 
covering proven preventive services under Medicare and Medicaid and eliminating any 
cost-sharing for preventive services in Medicare. The Senate bill would go further by 
prohibiting private insurance plans from charging cost-sharing for preventive services 
(except for existing grandfathered plans and those that use a value-based insurance 
design). The bill also would expand the number of covered preventive services, including 
an annual wellness visit under Medicare and a comprehensive health risk assessment, 
personalized prevention plan, and tobacco-cessation programs for pregnant women  
under Medicaid. 
 
Both the House and Senate bills call for development of a national prevention and 
health-promotion strategy that sets specific goals through a variety of mechanisms, 
including a prevention and public-health investment fund, competitive grants to state and 
local governments and community-based organizations, and creation of task forces on 
clinical and community preventive services that foster greater attention on prevention. 
They also would provide support for employer wellness programs, with grants for 
qualified employer-wellness programs in the House and technical assistance to small 
businesses in the Senate bill. Care would need to be taken to ensure that federal funds do 
not substitute for dollars now being spent by employers and state and local government, 
or prematurely cover programs of unproven effectiveness. 
 
Utilizing Value-Based Benefit Design 
A key to obtaining value for health spending is having evidence of which treatments are 
effective, how they work in different circumstances and for different patients, and how 
well they work relative to available alternatives. Armed with such evidence, physicians 
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and patients can make informed choices about which medications to take, which surgical 
procedures to undergo, and which medical devices (such as artificial hips) are reliable. 
Tying such information to insurance benefit design and payment can further enhance 
incentives for physicians and patients to select the most effective and most cost-effective 
treatment option. For example, many countries use “reference pricing” for prescription 
drugs—that is, paying the price of the lowest-cost equally effective drug for treatment of 
a condition. If a physician and patient opt for a more expensive, but no more effective, 
drug, the patient has that option but pays the difference in price. This provides a powerful 
market incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to lower prices to reflect the value of 
the drugs they produce. 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) included $1.1 
billion for comparative effectiveness research, including $700 million to the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), of which $400 million is to be transferred to 
the National Institutes of Health. An additional $400 million is to be used by the HHS 
secretary to conduct, support, or synthesize comparative effectiveness research and to 
encourage the development and use of infrastructure and systems to generate or obtain 
outcomes data. The provision also establishes an interagency advisory panel to help 
coordinate and support comparative effectiveness research. 
 
The House bill would support establishment of a Center for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research within AHRQ to conduct, support, and synthesize research on 
outcomes, effectiveness, and appropriateness of health care services and procedures. An 
independent Comparative Effectiveness Research Commission would oversee the 
activities of the center. The Senate bill would create an independent Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute to set a national research agenda and conduct comparative 
clinical effectiveness research. 
 
The debate over the ARRA provision was acrimonious—with opponents arguing 
that funding comparative effectiveness research would result in the government telling 
physicians which medications to prescribe or denying life-saving treatment to the elderly 
and disabled. As a result, there are only modest provisions on comparative effectiveness 
in the health reform bill. Still, 54 percent of health care opinion leaders believe 
establishing a center for comparative effectiveness research to produce and disseminate 
information on effectiveness, guide clinical practice, and inform benefit design would be 
an effective strategy for reducing the growth in health care costs.45
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The House and Senate bills include modest provisions that would utilize 
comparative effectiveness research in designing patient financial incentives, called value-
based insurance design. Under the House bill, the HHS secretary would have the 
authority to alter patient cost-sharing and payment rates in the public health insurance 
plan option to encourage the use of services that promote health and value. The Senate 
bill exempts value-based insurance plans from certain requirements. Such strategies 
could create financial incentives for patients and physicians to avoid high-cost treatments 
that are no more effective than other, lower-cost alternatives. Benefit designs also could 
require use of patient decision aids or prior authorization systems for cases in which a 
treatment’s effectiveness depends on the patient’s preferences or specific health 
condition. Eighty-six percent of health care opinion leaders favor granting an independent 
Medicare advisory council the authority to alter Medicare beneficiary incentives based on 
the effectiveness of services, drugs, and devices.46
 
RAND reports that, while there is substantial evidence that value-based insurance 
design leads to better adherence to chronic care drug regimens, the total effect on health 
system spending would be small.47 Under the most optimistic scenario, they estimate that 
value-based benefit design would reduce national health expenditures by 0.3 percent 
between 2010 and 2019. 
 
Promoting Quality Improvement and Public Reporting 
The Commonwealth Fund Commission has documented wide variation in quality of care 
across the U.S. By setting targets and implementing policies that meet and raise 
benchmarks of top performance, the U.S. could save lives, improve Americans’ quality of 
life and care experiences, lower safety risks to patients, and prevent the onset of disease 
and complications. For example, the Path report notes that up to 100,000 lives could be 
saved annually if the U.S. reduced rates of mortality amenable to medical care to those 
achieved in the best three countries. It also finds that the proportion of adults receiving 
recommended preventive care could be increased from 50 percent to 80 percent if the 
U.S. reached attainable benchmark rates of preventive care.48
 
Both the House and Senate bills call for public reporting on the quality and 
efficiency of care. This effort would build on current Medicare databases on the quality 
of hospital, nursing home, and home health care and would be expanded to include health 
outcomes and cost comparisons. National, regional, and state databases also would 
include standardized reporting of insurance revenues and claims to enable comparisons of 
administrative, marketing, and other overhead costs, as well as medical-loss ratios and 
insurers’ margins. Publicly reported data would help inform improvement efforts by 
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providing benchmarks based on top performance. Spread of health information 
technology would enable an ever-richer information resource that could be used to 
identify and learn from efforts to reach and raise benchmarks of top performance in 
health outcomes and patient care experiences. 
 
The Senate bill lays out a comprehensive strategy for quality improvement. It 
would require HHS to develop a national strategy to improve the delivery of health care 
services, patient health outcomes, and population health and publish an annual national 
health care quality report card. It calls for development of quality measures that would 
enable assessments of health outcomes, continuity, and coordination of care; safety, 
effectiveness, and timeliness of care; health disparities; and appropriate use of health care 
resources. It also requires public reporting on quality measures through a user-friendly 
Web site, and requires hospitals to report preventable readmission rates. It creates an 
interagency working group to coordinate and streamline federal quality activities. 
 
Encouraging Medicare Private Plan Competition 
Currently, Medicare beneficiaries have a choice of enrolling in a private Medicare 
Advantage (MA) plan or being covered under the Medicare fee-for-service program. 
Initially, private managed care plans were paid at 95 percent of projected Medicare per 
capita fee-for-service costs in each county, to allow the government to share in anticipated 
savings from this model of care and to account for any “favorable selection”—the 
tendency for healthier (and less costly) beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans—
that might occur. 
 
Medicare beneficiary enrollment in private plans grew rapidly in the 1990s, but 
then declined markedly when the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, which tightened fee-for-
service payment rates for providers in the traditional Medicare program, resulted in 
slower growth in private plan payment rates as well.49 The 2003 Medicare Modernization 
Act not only covered prescription drugs but established a new payment system for 
managed care and other types of private plans; this system has led to payments that now 
average about 113 percent of Medicare fee-for-service costs.50
 
MA plans submit bids that represent the payment rate they would require to be 
able to provide the same benefits offered by traditional Medicare. The payment received 
by the plan for each enrollee is based on the relationship of its bid to a benchmark rate 
established for each county and updated annually. If the plan’s bid is below the 
benchmark, the plan receives the amount of the bid plus 75 percent of the difference 
between the bid and the benchmark. These additional funds must be returned to 
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beneficiaries through additional services or premium reductions. If a plan’s bid is at or 
above the benchmark, it receives the benchmark amount. 
 
The House bill would restructure payments to MA plans, phasing the benchmarks 
down to 100 percent of fee-for-service costs in each county and offering bonus payments 
for quality. The Senate restructures payments to MA plans using new benchmarks 
computed from the weighted average of plan bids, with bonus payments for quality, 
performance improvement, care coordination, and efficiency. Although the average 
benchmark under the Senate provision would approximately equal 100 percent of fee-for-
service costs nationwide, there could be large differences between MA payments and fee-
for-service costs in many counties.51 The Senate bill cushions the change for 
beneficiaries in those counties by requiring the HHS secretary to provide additional 
transitional benefits to beneficiaries who experience a reduction in benefits under 
competitive bidding. CBO estimates 10-year federal budget savings of $170 billion from 
the House bill and $136 billion from the Senate bill. 
 
Recognizing that overpayment sends a price signal that discourages efficiency  
and value, these provisions would eliminate, in the aggregate, excess payment to MA 
plans. Doing so would address the inequity of providing funding that is used for extra 
benefits to Medicare beneficiaries who enroll in these plans but not for those in 
traditional Medicare, and ensure that the federal government does not reward higher-cost 
coverage. More than three-fourths of health care opinion leaders (77%) support bringing 
payment of Medicare managed care plans in line with the traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare program.52
 
SYSTEM REFORM PROVISIONS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 
To achieve a high performance health system, reform proposals must go beyond ensuring 
affordable coverage to address health system changes that will improve outcomes and the 
quality of care, increase efficiency, and slow the growth in total health system costs. The 
House and Senate bills include key provisions that would affect the way we pay for care 
by giving providers an incentive to deliver high-value care, as well as slow the rate of 
increase in health care costs over time by requiring ongoing productivity improvements. 
In combination with provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, they would enhance the value obtained for health spending and set in motion 
reforms to slow the growth in health care costs over the long term. 
 
The federal budget impact of the health care payment and delivery system reform 
provisions of the House bill and the Senate bill are detailed in Exhibit 6. The House bill 
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has $456 billion of payment and system reform savings, compared with $491 billion in 
the Senate bill. New savings come primarily from the productivity improvement 
requirement and other changes in provider payment updates ($177 billion in the House 
bill and $154 billion in the Senate bill) and from correcting Medicare Advantage payment 
rates ($170 billion in the House bill and $136 billion in the Senate bill). Some provisions 
add to Medicare outlays, at least over the 10-year budget horizon, while improving health 
system performance and laying a foundation for future changes and eventual savings. 
 
CBO estimates that, from 2010 to 2019, the insurance coverage expansions and 
improvements in the House bill will cost $891 billion and those in the Senate bill will 
cost $748 billion—the difference occurs primarily because the House bill goes further to 
make coverage affordable for low- and moderate-income families (Exhibit 7). These 
costs would be more than offset by system savings and new revenues. Over the same time 
period, provisions in the House bill would reduce the deficit by $138 billion and those in 
the Senate bill would reduce the deficit by $130 billion. CBO further estimates that both 
bills would reduce the federal deficit in the following decade. 
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Exhibit 7. Major Sources of Savings and Revenues Compared with 
Projected Spending, Net Cumulative Effect on Federal Deficit, 2010–2019
Dollars in billions
Source: The Congressional Budget Office Preliminary Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10731. The Congressional Budget Office Analysis of H.R. 3962, 
The Affordable Health Care for America Act, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10741. 
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New Revenue Sources 
Savings from delivery system reforms and improvements would offset nearly two-thirds 
of the net cost of coverage expansion in the Senate bill and just over half of the net cost 
of coverage expansion in the House bill. In both bills, new revenues would more than 
offset the remainder of the costs (Exhibit 8). Both the House and the Senate look to the 
health industry as a source of financing and include new taxes or fees on medical device 
manufacturers, manufacturers and importers of branded drugs, and health insurance providers. 
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Exhibit 8. Proportions of System Savings and New Revenue 
in House and Senate Bills
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In the House bill, three-fifths of the new revenues come from a surcharge on 
wealthy families earning more than $1,000,000, or individuals earning more than 
$500,000, per year. This surcharge would not be indexed for inflation; despite this, the 
surcharge is unlikely to burden a significantly larger share of the population in the next 
decade.53 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that this surcharge would 
yield $461 billion in new revenues over 2010 to 2019.54
 
In the Senate bill, the largest source of new revenues, accounting for nearly a third 
of the new revenues, would be a tax on high-premium health insurance plans. The bill 
would impose a 40 percent excise tax on health insurance premiums over a given 
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threshold ($8,500 for individual policies and $23,000 for family policies) beginning in 
2013. The premium threshold would be indexed to the consumer price index plus one 
percentage point in subsequent years; this increase would be slower than the rate of 
health care cost growth, resulting in an annual increase in the number of people with 
plans that exceed the threshold unless health care cost growth slows substantially. The 
JCT estimates this would yield revenues of $149 billion over 2010 to 2019. 
 
The theory is that such a tax would reduce the use of “Cadillac” plans that offer 
excessive benefits and, as a result, employers would offer more basic plans and use the 
reduction in premium expenses to raise employee wages, which would generate income 
and payroll tax revenue. By this reasoning, the reduced coverage of excessive benefits 
also would control the growth in utilization of services. A majority of health care opinion 
leaders (58%) support ending the federal income tax exemption for employer-financed 
premiums above a certain level as an approach to financing coverage expansion. 
 
In the authors’ view, however, there is little empirical evidence that a tax on high-
premium plans would target those plans that provide excessive benefits, and thus little 
evidence the tax would have a significant effect on health care spending.55 Moreover, 
Commonwealth Fund researchers have found that ending the income tax exemption 
across-the-board could adversely affect individuals who are already at high risk of losing 
their health coverage.56 Evidence suggests that such a policy could disproportionately 
affect workers in small firms, older workers, and wage earners in industries with high 
expected claims costs. To avoid putting sicker, older, and low- or modest-income 
families at increased health and financial risk, and to avoid potentially undermining 
current employer-sponsored, pooled-risk group coverage, a cap on the tax exemption for 
plan premiums would have to take into account the health characteristics of enrollees. A 
better alternative would be a tax on nonessential benefits that go below the benefit 
packages offered through the insurance exchange. 
 
ASSESSING THE BILLS’ POTENTIAL IMPACT 
Medicare expenditures are currently projected to grow 6.6 percent annually over 2010 to 
2019 (Exhibit 9). Applying the net Medicare savings in the House bill bends the 
Medicare spending curve and reduces the projected annual growth rate to 5.2 percent, 
according to CBO; in the Senate bill the growth rate is projected to be reduced to 5.3 
percent. The CMS actuary, in a separate estimate, projects Medicare cost growth at 5.4 
percent under the House bill.57 Although additional federal outlays are required to cover 
the uninsured and improve benefits for the underinsured, these are one-time shifts in 
spending. The Medicare provisions in the reform bills set in motion genuine reform that 
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enhances value and slows the underlying rate of spending growth, with important long-
term implications. Total 10-year savings resulting from Medicare system reforms in the 
House bill are estimated at $484 billion by CBO, and $469 billion by the CMS actuary. 
Medicare system savings are projected by CBO to total $387 billion over 10 years under 
the Senate proposal. 
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Exhibit 9. Medicare Spending with System Savings, 2010–2019:
Current Projection and Alternative Scenarios
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Projecting the savings and costs of policy changes is, in many ways, an art rather 
than a science. Certainly, CBO tries to produce reasonable estimates, as do agencies and 
organizations such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Yet estimates can 
vary significantly as a result of differences in the way policies are designed and 
assumptions built into the estimating models. Exhibit 10 illustrates differences among the 
estimated savings of health reform options outlined in Finding Resources for Health 
Reform and Bending the Health Care Cost Curve, a Commonwealth Fund report; 
proposals from the president estimated by the OMB, and estimates by CBO.58 As shown, 
the estimates vary widely across these sources. Although some portion of these 
differences may be related to alternative specifications of the proposed policies, CBO is 
particularly conservative in estimating savings based on changed incentives for providers, 
since it maintains that more evidence is required as a firm basis for such projections. 
 28
THE 
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
Exhibit 10. Bending the Curve: 
Options that Achieve Savings
Cumulative 10-Year Federal Budget Savings
Aligning Incentives with Quality and Efficiency
• Hospital pay-for-performance –$  43 billion           –$    3 billion –$  12 billion
• Bundled payment with productivity updates –$123 billion           –$201 billion –$110 billion
• Strengthening primary care and care coordination –$  83 billion           +$   6 billion —
• Modify the home health update factor — –$  50 billion –$  37 billion
Correcting Price Signals in the Health Care Market
• Reset Medicare Advantage benchmark rates –$135 billion           –$158 billion –$175 billion
• Reduce prescription drug prices –$  93 billion           –$110 billion –$  75 billion
• Limit payment updates in high-cost areas –$100 billion           –$  51 billion —
• Manage physician imaging –$  23 billion           –$    3 billion —
Producing and Using Better Information
• Promoting health information technology –$  70 billion           –$ 61 billion –$  13 billion
• Comparative effectiveness –$174 billion           +$  1 billion —
Promoting Health and Disease Prevention
• Public health: reducing tobacco use –$  79 billion           –$ 95 billion —
• Public health: reducing obesity –$121 billion           –$ 51 billion —
• Public health: alcohol excise tax –$  47 billion           –$ 60 billion —
Source: R. Nuzum, S. Mika, C. Schoen, and K. Davis, Finding Resources for Health Reform and 
Bending the Health Care Cost Curve (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, July 2009).
Path Estimate        CBO Estimate          OMB Estimate
 
 
Another example of the potential for different perspectives on the potential effects 
of specific policies is CBO’s estimates of savings from negotiating pharmaceutical prices. 
CBO estimates no savings from negotiation of pharmaceutical prices by the HHS 
secretary over those currently obtained by pharmaceutical benefit managers. Yet other 
countries achieve substantially lower drug prices than the United States through systems 
of price negotiation on behalf of their entire population. The U.S. pays far more per 
capita for pharmaceutical products than other countries, with the differences growing 
wider over the last 15 years (Exhibit 11). Countries such as Germany and Denmark have 
had great success with “reference pricing”—paying the price of the lowest-cost drug in a 
given category, with patients paying the difference. Through such a system, patients have 
an incentive to select the lowest-cost, equally effective alternative. In the U.S., such 
concepts are labeled value-based benefit design.59
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Exhibit 11. Pharmaceutical Spending per Capita: 1995 and 2007
Adjusted for Differences in Cost of Living
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These differences in perspective have led CBO to substantially underestimate the 
savings from and overestimate the costs of the proposals included in the last three major 
health reforms (Exhibit 12). A recent analysis of CBO estimates of health reforms in the 
past three decades by Jon Gabel of the National Opinion Research Center illustrates the 
magnitude of this tendency.60 Actual savings from the Medicare hospital prospective 
payment system introduced in 1983 were double those estimated by CBO. Health care 
savings from the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 were 113 percent greater in 1999 than 
CBO projections. Actual spending under the Medicare Modernization Act was 40 percent 
lower than projected. 
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Exhibit 12. CBO Estimates of Major Health Legislation 
Compared with Actual Impact on Federal Outlays
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Actual ImpactCBO ProjectionHealth Provision
Source: J. Gabel, “Congress’s Health Care Numbers Don’t Add Up,” New York Times, Aug. 25, 2009.  
 
Gabel notes that CBO has particular difficulty estimating savings when it 
considers more than one change at a time. He notes CBO’s reluctance to project savings 
from initiatives that represent significant changes from current policy; for example, its 
projected estimate of zero savings from the pilots on innovative payment methods. 
Commonwealth Fund studies of ways to invest in primary care, create medical homes, 
bundle hospital acute-care episode payments with post-hospital care, and make productivity 
improvements find that such policies have the potential to yield considerable savings.61
 
Given the inevitable uncertainties as new terrain is traversed, Congress may want 
to establish a system for monitoring actual spending and savings, as well as access and 
quality, over time. Certain actions or features of health reform could be conditioned on 
actual experience, rather than hinging on information that is inherently difficult to project 
with any precision. 
 
NATIONAL HEALTH SPENDING AND OTHER IMPACTS 
By mandate, CBO focuses on federal budget cost. It does not provide estimates to 
Congress of the effect of policies on cost-containment across the health system. By 
contrast, the Commonwealth Fund Bending the Curve report focuses on total health 
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spending, including spending by employers and households.62 If a certain policy saves 
money for employers or households because, for example, premiums are reduced or rise 
at a slower rate, those would be desirable and much-needed savings. Such savings are just 
as beneficial to American families and businesses as a tax cut and deserving of much 
greater attention. 
 
In fact, over the last decade health insurance premiums have taken a toll on real 
incomes of working families. Health insurance premiums have more than doubled, rising 
by 108 percent while workers’ earnings have increased by 32 percent, and the consumer 
price index has increased by 24 percent (Exhibit 13). Family premiums as a percentage of 
family incomes have increased from 11 percent at the beginning of this decade to 18 
percent today. With increases in employer health insurance premiums regularly 
exceeding economic growth, ever-higher health spending has directly contributed to 
stagnating or declining incomes for middle-class families and workers.63
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Exhibit 13. Premiums Rising Faster Than Inflation and Wages
* 2008 and 2009 NHE projections. 
Data: Calculations based on M. Hartman et al., “National Health Spending in 2007,” Health Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2009; 
and A. Sisko et al., “Health Spending Projections through 2018,” Health Affairs, March/April 2009. Insurance 
premiums, workers’ earnings, and CPI from Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational 
Trust, Employer Health Benefits Annual Surveys, 2000–2009.
Source: K. Davis, Why Health Reform Must Counter the Rising Costs of Health Insurance Premiums, (New York: 
The Commonwealth Fund, Aug. 2009). 
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High and rapidly rising premiums reflect the lack of competition in the health 
insurance market, high administrative costs, and the absence of effective private sector 
cost containment tools. A public plan is an important element of an overall strategy to 
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transform the insurance market and slow the growth in total system costs in the long 
term. CBO estimated that a robust public health insurance plan, with the authority to use 
Medicare payment rates and implement innovative payment methods (along the lines of 
the bill that was passed by the Ways and Means Committee), would yield a premium 10 
percent lower than private plans within the exchange and would enroll about 10 million 
people.64 Even more important, a public plan could slow the rate of increase in premiums 
over time by incorporating requirements for productivity improvement. 
 
The House bill, however, dropped the link between the public plan and Medicare 
payment rates, substituting a provision requiring the HHS secretary to negotiate provider 
payment rates. CBO estimated that the enacted House bill would cover only 6 million 
Americans under the public plan, or 2 percent of the 282 million people under age 65,  
in 2019. 
 
The Senate bill includes a community health insurance option that is publicly 
sponsored and negotiates provider payment rates up to the average commercial level. 
Individual states would be allowed to opt out of offering the option. CBO estimates that 
about 4 million people would choose a public plan, roughly 1.5 percent of the nonelderly 
people living in the U.S. in 2019. 
 
Nearly all of the individuals covered through the exchange, including through the 
public plan, are currently uninsured and would be eligible for premium subsidies. 
Employer-based coverage would remain the mainstay of the American insurance market, 
with 159 million Americans, or 57 percent of those under age 65, holding employer-
sponsored plans under the House bill and 152 million, or 54 percent of those under age 
65, under the Senate bill. 
 
There is great uncertainty about the long-term effectiveness of the public plan 
option in slowing cost growth. Initially, providers that care for uninsured and low-income 
patients are likely to participate, even with payment rates well below commercial rates, as 
most of those newly covered would be patients for whom safety-net providers now 
receive little or no payment. 
 
A Commonwealth Fund analysis of trends in national health expenditures finds 
that inclusion of a robust public plan could achieve system savings of $3 trillion, slowing 
the growth rate in national health expenditures over 2010 to 2020 from 6.5 percent to  
5.2 percent. Even an intermediate public plan option, closer to the House version and the 
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee version, would yield $2 trillion in 
 33
savings by slowing growth from 6.5 percent to 5.6 percent (Exhibit 14).65 A strong public 
health insurance plan could achieve significant system savings, providing much-needed 
relief to individuals and small-business workers. Three-fourths of health care opinion 
leaders support including a public health insurance option in the exchange.66
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Depending on how effective the secretary is in negotiating provider payment rates 
and lowering administrative costs, the public plan could put significant pressure on 
private insurers to slow growth in premiums for employers and workers over time, as the 
exchange is opened to larger firms. Currently, the U.S. health system has the highest 
administrative costs of any country—with $516 per capita spent on administration in 
2007, compared with an OECD median of $76 (Exhibit 15). A McKinsey report 
estimates that high administrative costs add an unnecessary $90 billion a year to health 
spending—costs borne both by employers and workers.67
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The House bill also would affect trends in total health system spending. Important 
provisions include the creation of the insurance exchange and insurance market rules, 
such as minimum medical-loss ratios for plans. Administrative overhead in individual 
plans now averaging 40 percent, and 15 percent to 35 percent in small-business plans, 
would fall to 12 percent to 14 percent in plans offered through the insurance exchange.68 
On average, 13 percent to 18 percent of private premiums now go toward administration 
(e.g., marketing, claims, and underwriting) and profit margins for the dominant 
commercial for-profit plans.69 We should expect these costs to decline if we simplify 
administration and intensify competition. CBO estimates that the exchange would lower 
administrative costs by four to five percentage points.70
 
The insurance market has grown increasingly concentrated in the last decade.71 In 
all but three states, two insurance plans account for over 50 percent of enrollment.72 
Without significant competition, plans can increase profit margins and simply pass along 
higher prices demanded by providers to employers and households, with administrative 
costs going up at the same rate in a form of “cost-plus” pricing. Including a public health 
insurance option or private cooperative plan in the exchange could act as a stimulant to 
increase competition and lower administrative overhead. 
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The House bill would provide for review of the rate of premium increases in plans 
participating in the exchange. Commonwealth Fund studies estimate that slowing 
premium growth by 1.0 percentage points annually would save $2,571 in family 
premiums in 2020; slowing by 1.5 percentage points annually, as pledged by an industry 
coalition, would save $3,759 for the average family in 2020.73 Slowing growth in 
national health expenditures by 1.5 percentage points annually would provide additional 
relief to businesses and households: the average family would save $2,200 in 2020 if the 
rate of increase could be reduced from 6.5 percent annually to even just 5.2 percent.74
 
AREAS FOR FURTHER ATTENTION 
The health reform proposals now passed in the House of Representatives and under 
consideration in the Senate will fundamentally change our present course of rising costs 
and increasing numbers of uninsured and underinsured people. The bills represent a 
pragmatic approach to closing the gaps in insurance coverage, building on a mix of 
employer coverage, private plans, a public plan in a health insurance exchange or 
exchanges, retention of Medicare, and expansion of Medicaid. Most of the ideas that have 
been advanced by policymakers and health care opinion leaders to deal with rising costs 
are reflected in the bills. 
 
Yet the U.S. health system is unlikely to reach its potential without more far-
reaching measures in the coming years. Even including the additional outlays for 
coverage of the uninsured and improved coverage of the underinsured, an estimated 18 
million to 24 million people will remain uninsured and the costs of coverage and care 
will create financial burdens for many others. The proposed reforms should lead to a 
substantial slowing of the growth in health spending, but further reforms may be needed 
to hold rates of increase in national health expenditures to a course that is sustainable and 
affordable to employers, households, and government. 
 
Regardless of the shape of health reform legislation, it will be especially 
important to establish a system for monitoring progress on agreed-upon health reform 
goals, with a mechanism for making mid-course corrections and further changes as 
needed to move the U.S. health system toward a high performance health system by 
2020. Estimates of cost and savings could be seriously under- or overestimated; if so, 
corrective actions may be required. Additional steps may be required to ensure 
affordability for families as well as stable financing. In addition, as experience is gained 
with new provider payment methods, strategies for harmonizing public and private 
provider payment will be needed to avoid having public and private incentives for 
providers working at cross-purposes. 
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Health Goals, Monitoring, and Reporting 
Explicit goals for health reform should be detailed in the legislation and a system 
instituted for monitoring progress toward those goals. They should include achievable 
goals by 2020 for: health outcomes; the share of population receiving care from patient-
centered medical homes and accountable care organizations; performance on quality, 
safety, and disparities in care; the share of population covered by health insurance 
meeting an affordability standard; and progress in bending the health care cost curve. 
Exhibit 16 presents illustrative health system performance goals for 2020 and examples 
of possible shorter-range target indicators. 
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Exhibit 16. Illustrative Health Reform Goals and Tracking Performance
1. Secure and Stable Coverage for All
• Percent of population insured
• Percent of population with premiums and out-of-pocket expenses within 
affordability standard
2. Slowing Growth of Total Health Spending and Federal Health Outlays
• Annual growth rate in total health system expenditures
• Annual growth rate in Medicare expenditures
• Impact on federal budget: new spending, net savings, new revenues
3. Health Outcomes and Quality
• Percent of population receiving key preventive services or screenings
• Percent of population with chronic conditions controlled
• Percent reduction in gap between benchmark and actual levels of quality 
and safety
4. Payment and Delivery System Reform
• Percent of population enrolled in medical homes
• Percent of physicians practicing in accountable care organizations
• Percent of provider revenues based on value
 
 
Coordinating national leadership for all of these components of the health system 
would enable the federal government to: 1) assign clear responsibility and authority for 
the key aspects of the health system, and 2) provide the necessary capacity to enable 
agencies and organizations to act to secure access for all, attain better health outcomes, 
and slow the rate of cost growth. The new leadership roles needed to provide a 
coordinated and systemic approach to improving population health and wresting better 
value from health spending should be addressed as part of health reform legislation. 
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Harmonization of Public and Private Provider Payment 
While the House bill makes a major start on rapid-cycle testing of payment innovation in 
Medicare, it does not specifically address private sector payment. Broadening the 
mandate of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to include both public and 
private sector payment would: 
 
• amplify the power of effective incentive approaches by sending the same signals 
about what is valued across different payers; 
• simplify administrative complexity and reduce burdens associated with existing 
payment methods, as well as minimize administrative burden for providers who 
must respond to these new methods; and 
• reduce the likelihood of payment distortions across payers or regions. 
 
A working group including a cross-section of clinicians, consumers, hospitals, 
employers, and policy experts has recommended harmonizing public and private payer 
innovation efforts to facilitate effective payment reform.75 It suggests that a Center for 
Payment and System Innovation specifically address the need to harmonize and align 
public and private payers. The group also suggests that the center should foster Medicare 
and Medicaid participation in local payment pilots designed by other payers and 
providers that are responsive to state and regional community needs, as well as support 
pilots designed and developed by federal officials that involve the private sector and state 
payers—thus participating in both bottom-up and top-down efforts. 
 
Congress also should make clear that it wants rapid-cycle testing and learning, 
coordination across pilots so that providers desiring to participate in both medical home 
and accountable care organizations can do so, and rapid spread of successful innovations. 
It should provide the tools that CMS needs to carry out this function and make the HHS 
secretary accountable for doing so. 
 
Perhaps most important, Medicare, Medicaid, and private and public plans 
participating in the health insurance exchange (or exchanges) should incorporate proven 
payment methods as they emerge from rapid-cycle testing. Health reform should include 
provisions to harmonize provider payment rates under private plans, Medicare, Medicaid, 
a public plan, and/or health cooperative plans. A commission should be established and 
authorized to institute such a harmonized payment system as rapidly as possible, 
including making payment methods that are found to be effective in improving quality 
and/or slowing costs the basis of payment across payers—with payment from any source 
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linked to provider participation in all such plans. Productivity improvement requirements 
on increases in provider payment for plans covering those under age 65 should be similar 
to those required for Medicare payment increases. 
 
MOVING FORWARD AND MAKING HISTORY 
There is an urgent need to relieve both businesses and families of the crushing burden of 
rising health care costs. No one would argue that all of the benefits, costs, and 
consequences of health reform are known with certainty. What is known is that we 
cannot afford to continue on our current course. 
 
The House and Senate bills contain several provisions that would go a long way 
toward changing the financial incentives and support required to transform the 
organization and delivery of health care (Exhibit 17). Keys to long-run cost containment 
and improving quality of care that are incorporated in the House and Senate health reform 
bills include: 
 
1. Changing the insurance market 
2. Offering a public plan 
3. Instituting provider payment reform 
4. Adjusting payment for productivity improvement 
5. Creating an independent Medicare advisory board 
6. Negotiating pharmaceutical prices 
7. Incentivizing primary care and prevention 
8. Utilizing value-based benefit design 
9. Promoting quality improvement and public reporting 
10. Encouraging Medicare private plan competition. 
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Exhibit 17. Projected Savings and Effectiveness of System Reform
Provisions in House and Senate Reform Bills
2010–2019 (in billions)
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The combined effect of these provisions on trends in national health expenditures 
is difficult to estimate, and CBO has indicated that it does not have the modeling capacity 
to do so. The CMS actuary estimates modest increases in trends in national health 
expenditures from these provisions, but similarly gives little credit for savings to 
measures that would reform provider payment, negotiate prescription drug prices, 
increase competition among plans in an insurance exchange, encourage public reporting, 
or apply the results of comparative effectiveness research.76 Yet these measures are a 
crucial platform for developing and implementing policies to contain health care cost 
growth. As such, they have broad support from health care opinion leaders and business 
leaders as effective ways to control costs. A recent analysis by the Business Roundtable 
prepared by Hewitt, for example, found that such legislative reforms could potentially 
reduce the trend line in employment-based health care spending by $3,000 per employee 
by 2019.77
 
Both CBO and the CMS actuary assume that these provisions would bring 
significant savings to Medicare, of $484 billion and $469 billion, respectively, over 2010 
to 2019. Medicare outlays are projected to grow 6.6 percent annually from 2010 to 2019 
under current law. This growth would be slowed to 5.2 percent annually under CBO 
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estimates and 5.4 percent annually under the CMS actuary estimates. In 2019, Medicare 
spending as a percent of gross domestic product would be 3.8 percent under current law; 
it would fall to 3.3 percent under the House bill, according to CBO estimates. 
 
CBO estimates of federal budget impact, however, are fraught with uncertainty, 
given the multitude of changes and potentially synergistic effect. As detailed above, on 
the last three occasions when CBO has estimated the savings or costs of health reforms 
(the 1982–83 Medicare changes in hospital payment, the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, and 
the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act covering prescription drugs), it was wide of the 
mark—with savings more than double those estimated and cost overstated by 40 percent. 
 
There is good reason to be optimistic that the measures incorporated in the bills 
under consideration would stimulate significant changes in the organization and delivery 
of health services, and create powerful incentives to improve efficiency and productivity. 
Given the uncertainties that now exist, however, it will be especially important to 
establish a system for monitoring progress on agreed-upon health reform goals and 
provide a mechanism for mid-course corrections and further changes as needed to move 
the U.S. toward a high performance health system by 2020. Estimates of costs and 
savings could be seriously under- or overestimated; if so, corrective actions may be 
required. Implementing a new insurance exchange and testing payment and system 
reform innovations may call for additional steps as experience is gained and lessons  
are learned. 
 
Congressional oversight will be critical as health reform implementation 
proceeds. Congress should insist that the administration establish a system for tracking 
performance on major health reform goals, with annual reports issued by the president 
and recommendations for additional policy actions. If necessary, Congress can act in 
future years to modify reform, including phasing in various provisions more slowly or 
quickly, or adding additional safeguards or savings. 
 
Even under current estimates, 18 million to 24 million people will remain 
uninsured and many others will still face financial barriers to obtaining needed care. 
Additional steps may be required to ensure affordability for families as well as  
stable financing. 
 
Finally, the one major disappointment in the proposed bills is the absence of 
significant incentives or levers for private insurers to control health care costs. Private 
insurers, in opposing a public plan, have basically argued that they do not have the ability 
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to slow premium growth or achieve economies because of demands for higher prices 
from a powerful health care provider sector. Over time, as experience is gained with new 
provider payment methods, strategies for harmonizing public and private provider 
payment will be needed to avoid having public and private provider incentives working at 
cross-purposes. 
 
Congress has a historic opportunity to pass comprehensive health care reform 
legislation this year. Multiple strategies for improving quality and slowing the growth  
in total health system spending will help spark economic recovery, put the nation back  
on the road to fiscal responsibility, and ensure that millions more families will be able  
to get the care they need, while having financial security and relief from rising  
insurance premiums. 
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